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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 22 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU

(Ethiopia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A.de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. J.IENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M.FARABANOV
Mr. N.MINTCHEV
Mr. G.GUELEV
Mr. M.KARASSTILEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J.BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M.BURNS
Mr. J.E.G.HARDY
Mr. J.F.M.BELL
Mr. R.M.TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J.HAJEK
Mr. M.ZEMLA
Mr. V.TYLNER
Mr. J.RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S.JALL
Mr. A.S.MEHTA
Mr. P.M.GEORGE
Mr. G.D.COMMAR

Italy:

Mr. F.CAVALLETTI
Mr. A.CAGIATA
Mr. C.COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F.LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. STAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. M. ABAGIU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDEBERG
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Mr. J. LEWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. L. I. MENDELEVICH
Mr. P. F. SHAPKOV
Mr. B. I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. M. H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A. E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT

Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the seventy-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As has been said this morning by a number of representatives in the course of the informal discussion that preceded this meeting, it has been some time since we were able to devote ourselves to the very important questions of general and complete disarmament which have been laid down in our agenda by our co-Chairmen. I find that I am going back a considerable time in reverting to the subject of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and its verification. It may seem a little like going back over dusty records, but since the subject is one of such importance, and since I presume that we shall have only one or two, if any, more meetings on it, it seems necessary to put on record again certain views on the discussion that took place on 10 August, which was, as representatives will recall, the last meeting at which it was discussed (ENDC/PV.68). I shall be referring to what the former representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, said then with regard to verification of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. He was comparing the verification that would be required under the Soviet plan and what would be required under the United States plan, and the Canadian delegation has studied very carefully what is set out in the verbatim records of that and other relevant meetings, including the statements of the Soviet Union. We should like to say that we welcome the serious effort that was made by Mr. Zorin to comprehend the Western suggestions on a system of zonal inspection devised to be applied to the three-stage elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles proposed in the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30), which of course is supported by those nations here which are associated and allied with the United States.

Mr. Dean had given an exposition of these suggestions in regard to zonal inspection and, of course, his exposition was not intended to apply to the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I, which forms part of the Soviet proposals. Although, as I say, Mr. Zorin seemed to make a real effort to understand the United States proposals in this matter of verifying the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, I am sorry to say that I do not think he really did understand. Perhaps that is the fault of the Western delegations not having been clear enough. I note that Mr. Zorin also did not understand the application of my remarks in

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previous meetings which were intended to point out the difficulties of verification which are inherent in the Soviet proposal for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage of disarmament.

Therefore, I should like today to take a few minutes to try to clear up some misconceptions which are evident in what the former leader of the Soviet delegation said on 10 August. I shall not try to explain what the zonal inspection plan means and how it applies. I can very well leave that to my United States colleague. Mr. Zorin said:

"On 6 and 8 August, the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, tried to explain to us how the Western Powers envisaged such a system of control; but it is obvious that his views in this regard in the first place are politically unacceptable and, secondly are completely unfeasible in practice."

"What is the trend of Mr. Burns' proposals? If we understood him correctly - and at the meeting of 8 August he tried very hard to preclude any possible misunderstanding of his views - it appears that the Canadian representative suggests that, even before we start to destroy one single rocket, one single submarine, one single bomber, one single atomic gun, international controllers should be instructed to scour every nook and cranny in the territories of all the countries in the world, in order to find out whether there were not somewhere some hidden stockpiles of means of delivery or clandestine plants for their production, apart from those declared by the States." (ENDC/PV.68,pp.37-38)

I thought I had explained clearly what I meant on 8 August (ENDC/PV.67,pp.44-45) but as Mr. Zorin still seemed not to understand I shall have to repeat the argument. The emphasis should be placed on the word "all", in the proposition that all the nuclear weapon vehicles of the West would not be destroyed before it was certain that all those of the East had been disclosed, or a reasonable assurance had been obtained to that effect. When one says "all will not be destroyed", obviously that allows it to be understood that some might be destroyed. I made that statement, I repeat, relative to implementing the 100 per cent first stage Soviet proposal. But Mr. Zorin seemed to think that I meant what I said to apply to the way verification would be carried out under the United States proposal, which is

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elimination in three stages extending over six years and more. Obviously it is a very different thing to carry out an inspection by zones, which would give a sufficient degree of certainty that all nuclear weapon vehicles had been eliminated over that period of time, than to carry it out in eighteen or twenty-four months, as the Soviet plan would require. So I am not at all surprised that Mr. Zorin saw difficulties in my proposition. Indeed, I quite expected him to see those difficulties. But they are difficulties which exist in verifying elimination according to the Soviet plan and not difficulties of verification in the United States plan. I hope that I have now made myself understood.

The Soviet delegation has up to now failed to provide us with a description of how verification would be carried out under its proposal for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, although it has been invited to do so a number of times by Western delegations. As it has not given us this explanation, perhaps it might not be taken amiss if I set out at this time a few of the elements of the problem which would have to be solved if the measures proposed by the Soviet Union were to be verified.

At the beginning of the process of disarmament there will be a number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, intercontinental bombers, intermediate range ballistic missiles and bombers and a host of other short-range means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the hands of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers, but principally in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. To simplify the discussion I shall restrict it to the problem of eliminating the intercontinental ballistic missiles and verifying their elimination, because the same principles which we should elaborate in relation to those would apply also to verifying the abolition of other and less spectacular nuclear weapon vehicles. Of course, the numbers of the intercontinental ballistic missiles possessed by each side are a military secret, but for purposes of discussion here it is desirable to set some figure so that we can get a notion of what has to happen.

For this purpose I would turn again to the pamphlet published by the British Institute of Strategic Studies, to which we have referred during our discussion of the strategic situation with regard to conventional forces when and if the Soviet Union proposal for the first stage of the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapons should be put into effect. That was the discussion which was carried out between the Western delegations -- including the Canadian delegation -- and the Soviet Union

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delegation. Looking at the pamphlet we find that it suggests that the Soviet Union may possess as few as fifty or as many as 200 of these intercontinental nuclear vehicles. For the purposes of our discussion let us put that number midway between those two figures, say at 120. As for the United States ICBM's, the pamphlet suggests that about sixty will be in service as of now and a considerably greater number later this year and early in 1963; the number is left vague, but, from other indications, it might be as many as 300. Let us for our purposes put the number of ICBM's available to the United States at a figure midway between these two -- say 180.

These missiles -- of both the Soviet Union and the United States -- are, at the beginning of the process of disarmament, on their launching pads and, according to the Soviet Union proposal, as I understand it, will be destroyed there. Until they are destroyed they constitute, as we have agreed in our discussions here, a menace to the world and, of course, especially to the two parties possessing them; and that menace is the possibility of unimaginable destruction through nuclear war. But, if looked at from the viewpoint of the defence of each country, they are a deterrent. Mr. Khrushchev called them his country's most important means of defence. Their function as a deterrent is that they give the power to retaliate if an attack is launched by the other side, and this stops presumably rational governments from resorting to nuclear warfare. The location of these missile launching pads or bases is, by hypothesis, unknown.

Thus we have point A in the process of disarmament, the beginning point, where there are in existence 100 per cent of nuclear weapons vehicles and 0 per cent information, in theory. The problem is to get to point Z in the process, where there will be 0 per cent vehicles and 100 per cent inspection and verification.

The former head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Zorin, has spoken of 100 per cent verification, but without stating precisely what it will mean other than that there will be verification that the numbers of vehicles declared for destruction can be seen to be destroyed. Of course, that is not what the Western delegations understand by satisfactory verification. The West means, by verification, that it must be demonstrated to the international disarmament organization and to the world that no more nuclear weapon vehicles exist at all; and to demonstrate this, the state of affairs which the West would like to see is that which is postulated and described in the third stage of disarmament according to the Soviet Union draft treaty.

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The second and third paragraphs of article 38 of the Soviet draft treaty read as follows:

"2. For purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

"3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty." (ENDC/2, p. 24)

If that is considered by the Soviet Union to be the desired state of verification at the end of the disarmament process, why should it not apply when disarmament in the most dangerous weapons has been effective, that is, elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, since according to the Soviet Union that would eliminate the threat of nuclear war -- and the Soviet Union seems to imply that the risks of conventional warfare, by comparison, are negligible. If the Soviet Union would agree that the kind of verification which it proposes for stage III should apply at the end of the process of elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, whenever the termination of that process may be scheduled, I think that we should find the two sides in agreement on that point.

To repeat, the problem is to progress from point A of the process, where there are 100 per cent nuclear weapon vehicles and 0 per cent verification, to point Z, where there are 0 per cent nuclear weapon vehicles and 100 per cent inspection and verification. Clearly, that process is going to take time -- the Soviet Union has said that it will allow twenty-four months for it, although I am not quite clear about whether that is the exact time or not. It seems clear also that as the number of vehicles is decreased the amount of inspection should increase. Of course, for inspection or verification, space as well as time is involved. That is to say, in order to be sure of verifying that there are no hidden or overlooked means of delivery of the nuclear weapon, it is necessary to have the right of access to the whole extent of the territory of the parties concerned. Let us say that as that process of destruction goes on -- say for twenty months according to the Soviet Union idea -- each month six Soviet ICBM's and nine United States

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ICBM's will be destroyed; and throughout the twenty months, as the destruction goes on, an increasing amount of the territory on both sides ought to be brought under inspection. If, at the end of the process, all territory is to be open to inspection, as it would be according to article 38 of the Soviet Union draft treaty, one should proceed at the average rate of opening each month 5 per cent of national territory for complete inspection, including aerial inspection. How can that be done? Obviously, by dividing national territories into areas or blocks or zones for progressive opening to inspection. There may be some other way, but so far no one has explained what it is.

I think that what I have said so far shows that the destruction of ICBM's -- and, of course, of all other nuclear weapon vehicles -- has to be carried out by degrees, by a percentage reduction through some varying period of time, and that, as the destruction continues and approaches completion, increasingly large portions of territories of the nations concerned have to be open to inspection by the international disarmament organization so that it can be certain that there are no concealed stocks of nuclear weapon vehicles.

I have given this description of the elements of the problem which has to be solved and used certain notional figures of armaments and have applied my description to the period which the Soviet Union has chosen to say will be sufficient for the purpose. As I have said, the Soviet Union delegation has never given the Conference a clear explanation of how the total elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles provided for in its draft treaty would be carried out. Perhaps my remarks today may stimulate it to do so. But if it does not give that clear and full explanation the Canadian delegation will be obliged to conclude that the Soviet Government, in putting forward the proposals in articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of its draft treaty, has not worked out the implications thoroughly, or has not considered seriously enough the possibility that they would be adopted.

The Western delegations, of course, have other objections to the Soviet Union plan and they have been made very clear to the Conference. To mention them briefly, the first is that when we have done away with the nuclear weapons vehicles but have not done away with the nuclear weapon itself we have not done away with the possibility of nuclear war; and that has been confirmed by the highest Soviet authority. Then there is the question of the strategical imbalance which would

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occur in Europe if the nuclear weapon vehicles were abolished and the possibility of using the nuclear weapon in defence were entirely removed. Those factors, as well as the time required to inspect vast tracts of territory, in the view of the Western delegations here, require the extension of the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles to extend over three stages, and not over the relatively short single stage proposed by the Soviet Union.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest interest to the exceptionally interesting statement which the representative of Canada has just made to us.

Before embarking upon my remarks, I would like to join those who welcome the return to our meetings of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, and the Ambassador of Sweden, Mr. Edberg. Although we regret the departure of Mr. Lachs and Mrs. Myrdal, we are always delighted to see Mr. Naszkowski and Mr. Edberg return to our Conference.

As I indicated on 10 August (ENDC/PV.68) I have a further statement to make on sub-paragraph 5(b) of document ENDC/52, during which I will respond to some of the comments which Mr. Zorin, the then representative of the Soviet Union, made at that meeting on the problem of verification, particularly on the suggestions of the United States concerning the zonal technique.

There are several factors which I believe the Committee should keep in mind during our further examination of these matters. First, in the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) the United States was willing to highlight the necessity and the desirability of eliminating from the arsenals of States all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction along with all other armaments. My colleague Mr. Stelle pointed this out on 3 August (ENDC/PV.65, p.49). But, as he also said, when an attempt is made to treat one element of military power separately and differently from other elements it is vitally necessary to know exactly what is being talked about.

During the negotiations with my co-Chairmen leading to agreement on the items to be discussed in depth (ENDC/52), I informed Mr. Zorin that, in the interest of getting on with the work of the Conference, my delegation would consent to the wording of sub-paragraph 5(b), but that it would be quite impossible for the United States to talk about item (b), that is the item on nuclear delivery vehicles,

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without talking also at the same time about item (c), on conventional armaments, since, from a realistic and practical point of view, nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments cannot be strongly and clearly differentiated in drafting treaty obligations. It is for that simple reason that they are linked in the United States plan (ENDC/30, section A, p.4). I believe that the discussion thus far of sub-paragraph 5(b) with regard to the definition of what is a nuclear delivery vehicle has sufficiently demonstrated the logic underlying the United States approach.

Secondly, from the point of view of my delegation, the Soviet proposals appear to us to be a thinly disguised effort to bring about the complete dismantling of the Western defence system, the reasons for the existence of which are so well known as to need no elaboration by me here. In contrast, we believe the United States proposals for reducing major armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, to be an honest, fair and sincere attempt to begin the actual process of disarmament without jeopardizing the security of any State, while, at the same time, generating ever-growing confidence in the processes of disarmament and in the cause of peace among all States.

On 27 July, I described (ENDC/PV.62, p.30) what the world would look like at the end of stage I if the Soviet plan were actually to be implemented: that is, all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, all ships, all aircraft, all missiles, all rockets and all other means would have been eliminated completely; all production facilities for nuclear delivery vehicles would have been eliminated; all joint military installations of the United States and its allies would have been destroyed; and all forces of the United States and its allies would have been withdrawn to their own territories and would have been deprived of any real capability to fulfil their legitimate collective security commitments by being in a position to return promptly to threatened areas. On the other hand, the Soviet Union would be left in a quite apparently advantageous position. Its large remaining forces, centrally located in the heartland of Europe and Asia, with secure internal lines of communication and under single command, could still be deployed effectively against the rest of the Eurasian land mass. Those Soviet forces would represent the overwhelming national conventional force in Europe; and for the free world that would mean defeat, while for the Soviet Union it would mean victory.

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I have difficulty in believing that it can be maintained objectively that the Soviet proposals would not drastically upset the military balance presently existing in the world, thereby violating one of the basic jointly agreed disarmament principles. I have heard nothing in this conference room since my statement on 27 July, or before that time, which changes in any way the validity of what I have just said. There have been, of course, several lengthy exchanges between General Burns and Mr. Zorin on this matter, and General Burn's statement this morning was, indeed, most enlightening. But, I submit, none of Mr. Zorin's statements in that connexion invalidate the fundamental thesis which Mr. Burns and I have been expounding here that the Soviet proposals would indeed create serious and permanent imbalances, with the United States withdrawn from Europe and a powerful Soviet Union still very much in it, and would thus make for a less stable world at the end of stage I than we have now -- if that be possible.

There is one further general point I should like to make. The Soviet delegation has asserted that the principal defect of the United States proposals for reducing major armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, is that they do not eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union has asserted also that its proposals do eliminate that threat of a nuclear war. Well, I regret it, but I am forced to differ from my Soviet colleagues once again.

Let me be clear. Neither the Soviet nor the United States proposals eliminates the nuclear threat in stage I. Even if the Soviet proposals were to be implemented nuclear weapons themselves would still exist and there would still exist under the Soviet plan non-military -- to be sure -- but nevertheless most effective means such as civilian aircraft, ships etc. for delivering them to targets. The United States proposals, as I have said, do not claim to end the nuclear threat in stage I. We contend only that we would be making a realistic, honest, fair and practical start towards that objective.

But let us put aside those considerations for the moment and examine further the Soviet proposals. As my delegation said on 1 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.64, pp.34-36) several problems arise. How to define nuclear delivery vehicles? How to handle their production? How to verify accurately their reduction, or actively carry out efficiently and correctly their 100 per cent elimination, as our Soviet colleagues claim is possible in stage I under their plan?

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As already pointed out by my delegation at that meeting on 1 August (ibid., p.31), despite extensive study the United States has been unable to establish clearcut and universal criteria which could be used in all cases to distinguish clearly between nuclear delivery vehicles on the one hand and purely conventional armaments on the other. I submit that it is clear from the speeches of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union that he apparently shares this belief. This leaves us -- and the Soviet Union also, for that matter -- compelled to consider the elimination in the first stage of the Soviet plan of all vehicles of every type that can carry a nuclear weapon. The result of that would be to eliminate virtually all categories of major armaments leading, as my delegation has pointed out, to almost total disarmament in stage I with very little left over for stages II and III. Again, that not only would be contrary to the basic agreed principle of disarmament by stages but would, I submit, create a military imbalance and would not advance peace in the world.

In criticizing the United States approach of uniform reduction of major armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, the representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs, and also the Soviet delegation, claimed on 3 August (ENDC/PV.65) that the United States was beginning to regard nuclear armaments as conventional armaments. But, as we interpret the import of that remark, it is a line of reasoning that only creates the proverbial "straw man" which can easily be blown down and which bears no similarity to a real person or, I submit, to a real issue. The United States has never denied the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and, as Mr. Lachs himself pointed out (ENDC/PV.65, pp.32-36), it is the warhead or the bomb and not the delivering vehicle itself which is the determining criterion. Imagine the peace of mind of people in the world if some of them were being killed by nuclear weapons carried in ordinary vehicles -- that is, vehicles not specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons -- and if then the Soviet Union were to say: "Oops, I'm sorry, I didn't know a converted vehicle could deliver!"

On 1 August my delegation explained in detail the "twilight zone" which is occupied by dual-capability weapons systems and by vehicles which, although not specifically designed for the purpose, could in fact be used to deliver nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.64, pp.34 et seq.). That exposition reflected the existing armaments situation which we may personally regret -- as I indeed do -- but which nevertheless is indisputable as a matter of fact. Therefore, we again ask our Soviet colleagues

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to specify in detail in their draft treaty what weapons they have in mind for inclusion under the term "nuclear delivery vehicles" so that we can know exactly the breadth of scope which they are proposing for stage I.

I should like to touch briefly on the important matter of production. At our meeting on 6 August I pointed out (ENDC/PV.66,p.13) that the Soviet proposals on production are rather vague. They call in stage I for complete elimination of production of nuclear delivery vehicles and some undefined limitation on the production of conventional armaments; but there is no indication of the point during stage I at which the process would begin or end. There is still need for early and detailed clarification, and I sincerely hope that it will be forthcoming.

At the same meeting my delegation submitted significant changes in earlier United States proposals concerning production (ibid., p.11). In summary, the United States proposals now provide that :

First, the production of new types of armaments would be entirely prohibited during stage I.

Second, there could be no production except on the basis of replacement of the same type. We call this one-for-one replacement.

Third, routine testing of existing armaments would continue in order to test serviceability. However in the case of missiles, a limitation on the testing of missiles would be expressed by an agreed annual quota of test launchings.

Fourth, all parties to the treaty would make declarations concerning their existing armaments production facilities upon entry into force of the treaty; and agreement would be reached that production facilities for armaments would not be expanded.

Fifth, there would be agreed arrangements concerning the production of spare parts.

We believe these proposals take account of all valid criticisms which have been expressed here, criticisms to which the United States has given most serious consideration and we thank the representatives who have made such criticisms. Objectively considered, the United States proposals also demonstrate the inaccuracy of the Soviet contention that the United States wants to carry on the arms race under the guise of continued production. That, as can readily be seen, simply is not true. The statement will not bear analysis or inspection.

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I should now like to turn to the question of verification. The United States proposal for the reduction of major armaments during stage I was specifically intended, in so far as verification is concerned, to avoid placing impossible or overburdensome verification requirements on the international disarmament organization at a point early in its existence. The following aspects of verification must be considered in carrying out the reduction of major armaments called for in the United States plan.

First, there must be a check to make sure that the weapons being reduced are actually destroyed or actually converted to peaceful uses in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

Second, there must be means of assuring that production has been either discontinued or limited to agreed armaments at declared facilities and that no production is taking place at clandestine facilities.

Third, there must be some means to assure that armaments do not exist in excess of agreed levels at each step of the disarmament process.

On 10 August, I set forth (ENDC/PV.68, pp.10 et seq.) some of the issues on this matter and made some suggestions for a joint exploration of the problems in this area. On that same day the Soviet delegation made a rather lengthy reply to my statement. (ibid. pp.20 et seq.) I have carefully studied the Soviet delegation's comments for two reasons. First of all, the issues dealt with in the United States statement of 10 August are basic to our efforts to reach some common ground, with regard not only to inspection but also to the feasibility of various stage I measures. Secondly, I had a feeling as I listened to the Soviet representative that the serious dialogue between delegations that I had suggested had in fact begun. It was not that the Soviet representative presented any new Soviet views concerning verification, but the tone and the business-like presentation of areas of agreement and disagreement, as he saw them, were most welcome. I hope that my colleagues will note that I have taken Mrs. Myrdal's suggestion and no longer refer to the Soviet delegation's "workman-like presentation", but now refer to their doing it in a "business-like manner" -- although I personally prefer the word "workman-like".

I might say in passing that some sort of disarmament history was made by Mr. Zorin during the course of his statement and I would ask Mr. Kuznetsov to convey to Mr. Zorin my congratulations. I believe it is correct to say that, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, mirabile dictu, the Soviet Union

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charged that the suggestions of the United States relating to verification were inadequate and insufficient. I would like to comment on the substance of this point in a moment, but I am tempted to observe that if we have reached the time when the Soviet Government is urging more rather than less verification, then I submit that there is no limit to the surprises we might expect in the future.

In a more concrete vein, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss the real substance of the Soviet statement. It would appear that there is general agreement on two of the three types of verification. The first of these is the nature of the verification arrangements to assure all parties that armaments are actually being destroyed or are actually being converted to peaceful uses. However, it is still not clear whether we agree on the function of this on-the-spot verification, namely, whether the function is merely to verify that some destruction of armaments is indeed taking place or whether, as the United States believes, there is not an even more important additional function. That is, to verify that the destruction which is taking place on the basis of each party's declaration about quantities of each type corresponds to numbers or percentages prescribed for destruction at the given time under the terms of the treaty. We would appreciate further clarification by the Soviet delegation on this latter point. There seems to be general agreement also regarding verification of declared production facilities.

Thus, while the specifics of the aforementioned types of verification remain to be worked out, and an important clarification of Soviet views on one of the types of verification is required, the United States delegation welcomes the confirmation that what we thought were areas of general agreement are so in fact. Those areas of agreement, however, remain rather academic as long as the massive gap remains between our two positions with regard to verification measures directed at ensuring that the remaining armaments do not exceed agreed levels at each step in the disarmament process and that clandestine production facilities do not in fact exist.

However, some of the statements made by the Soviet representative lead me to believe that the Soviet Government has at last begun to recognize the need to assure that remaining arms do not in fact exceed given levels, at least at the zero level. That would be, if true, a most important acceptance of a principle which in the past has caused one of our main differences. The question between us, therefore, would no longer be one of principle but of the application of the principle in practice.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

There are various questions which have been raised by the statement made by the Soviet representative on 10 August. My purpose in discussing these questions today -- and I wish to emphasize this -- is not to make debating points. My purpose is to continue this dialogue in depth between our delegations, to further our understanding of areas of agreement and disagreement and thus to underline the areas where mutual accommodation is necessary. I should therefore like to deal with some of the questions raised by the Soviet representative in his statement. I will do it in the course of responding to the objections which the Soviet representative expressed concerning my statement, and in that way there may be more food for thought for each delegation.

Let us look at what those objections were. It was maintained that under the Soviet stage I proposals verification would be easier since it was simpler to verify a 100 per cent elimination than it was to verify a 30 per cent reduction. Leaving aside the question of lack of balance in the Soviet proposals and considering only the matter of verification, it seems clear to my delegation that this Soviet argument is beside the point.

In both plans, whether the complete elimination of certain types of armaments is reached in stage I or in stage III, nations must pass through the intervening period, from the initial levels of arms to the point where arms are eliminated. Whether we call them steps or stages, under both plans nations will have to pass through the points where 30 per cent of the arms are destroyed, 50 per cent of the arms are destroyed, 70 per cent of the arms are destroyed, and so on. It is of course true that under stage I of the Soviet plan this problem is more acute since it would happen in such a short period of time that there would be little time for verification at each step; but this intervening period would have to be passed through nevertheless. Quite clearly, even under the Soviet plan, no State would tolerate a situation under which it had disposed of 90 per cent of its delivery vehicles in the first twenty of the twenty-four months in stage I, whereas another powerful State disposed of only 50 per cent of its nuclear vehicles in those twenty months, while promising to dispose of the remaining 50 per cent in the last four months.

The requirement for balanced and simultaneous reductions among all parties is thus common to both the United States and the Soviet plans. However, if I understand the Soviet proposals (ENDC/2), almost the entire process of proceeding from existing

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levels of nuclear delivery vehicles down to zero would be ignored from the point of view of verifying that the parties kept in step. During the reduction process, it is apparent from the Soviet plan that there would be no verification at any particular level between 100 per cent and the time that zero had been reached. Only at the very end of the process of disarmament does the Soviet Union imply that there would be any semblance of verification that the ultimate level had been reached. In the theory of the apparent Soviet approach, only when nations were supposed to have reached zero level would there be any need to know what levels of arms in fact remained. I submit, however, that that approach ignores a basic concern of nations -- the need to assure that States are proceeding together in equitable and balanced stages in the reduction of their arms.

That is the first point I wished to make, and if Mr. Kuznetsov should tell me that I have misjudged the Soviet plan and that the Soviet Union also favours step-by-step reductions then I would answer that, in this case, the same problems of verifying a partial percentage reduction exist for the Soviet scheme within one stage as for the United States plan in a less hectic three stages.

My second point is that it appears that the Soviet delegation is proposing that even at zero level verification would only be of declared arms, installations and facilities. The right of the international disarmament organization would be limited to verification of 100 per cent of armaments which had been declared -- I emphasize that last phrase -- but not of armaments which a State, shall we say, might have forgotten or decided not to declare. Thus the nation which made a false, erroneous or forgetful declaration would have an advantage, which could be tremendous or could be small, but it would be an advantage. I make these points not to criticize but rather to seek clarification from the Soviet delegation with respect to its plan.

I believe it is clear that during the process of the disarmament programme under the Soviet plan nations would have little assurance that there was an order and a balance in the reduction process. But beyond this question, what are the consequences of this approach for the end of the reduction process?

The Soviet representative said on 10 August:

"We say that 100 per cent of the rockets will be eliminated and we will present this 100 per cent for elimination. But imagine for a moment that you have received information that at a certain place there is still another rocket ..."

(ENDC/PV.68, p.26)

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The first question is as I have noted: how would one find out this fact since one is allowed to verify only what is declared? Or did the Soviet representative mean to imply that the international disarmament organization inspectors would be allowed to go to any part of the Soviet Union about which they had received some sort of information indicating clandestine armaments?

There is, however, a second question -- assuming that one did find out about that rocket -- and it is the question which the Soviet representative posed: supposing we received this information? The answer of the Soviet representative was -- and I quote from the same passage of his statement: "you will catch the violator red-handed ... because to find even a single rocket is to prove violation" (ibid). But is it really quite so simple as that? Is that really the whole answer? Mr. Zorin, Mr. Kuznetsov and their countrymen may, at that time, be caught red-handed, but I and my countrymen might also be caught very red-faced, amazed and perhaps distraught. We do not want to be distraught.

Let us assume for illustrative purposes that Mr. Kuznetsov and I are the representatives of our two countries on the control council -- which heaven forbid; I am not submitting our two names for those jobs, I am merely illustrating my point -- and I tell my Soviet colleague that I have heard about a Soviet missile that has not been destroyed. My Soviet colleague replies: "You are right; there was a mix-up somewhere, and that missile you found out about proves we have violated the treaty. Oh, and by the way, it seems, Mr. Dean, that somehow there were 199 additional Soviet missiles that were not destroyed; and, as Mr. Zorin told you back on 10 August 1962, this is a clear case of violation of the treaty on our part. We ~~admit that the treaty was~~ violated. Oh, and before I forget, Mr. Dean, there is one further little matter; here is our proposition."

The question I should like to ask our Soviet colleagues is: what do I do then? Or what do they do if we are the other side? What practical remedy is there for this injustice? When the Soviet delegation can supply us with a truly convincing and logical answer to my question I believe I will understand better the security for all parties that the Soviet Union seems to see in its approach to verification. After all, I am not sure how the world's moral indignation will be weighed in the scales of international power politics against the unjustified possession of, say, 200 ICBM's by one Power.

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The point is that if there is verification merely that some arms are being destroyed -- by verification of destruction at agreed depots -- but no verification that States are reducing by agreed amounts through verification of remainders, there will be no assurance of the security of States during and at the end of the disarmament process. It is too late to do that at the end of the road, for then all the bridges, on one side at least, will have been burned, and for that side there is no turning back.

I should mention one further matter which relates to the Soviet Union's assertions that its inspection arrangements are easier to apply. The Soviet statement of 10 August, as will be seen from page 22 of document ENDC/PV.68, agreed on the importance of prohibiting the production of new types of nuclear delivery vehicles. In both plans that is one of the obligations from the very beginning of the first stage. But how, under the Soviet system of verification, would there be any assurance that new types of vehicles were not being produced? The declaration of existing production plants -- producing current types of delivery vehicles -- would, of course, not preclude production at other plants, especially in nations with large-scale and well-dispersed industrial machines, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, and, indeed, might not prevent production in other countries under contract, which I understand was one of the ways in which the Treaty of Versailles was violated. How would one verify that new plants for new types were not being constructed during stage I?

Let me turn now to the second complaint of the Soviet delegation regarding zonal inspections, a complaint closely related to its assertion that the Soviet verification proposals are easier and simpler to apply. The Soviet representative said that zonal inspection would be difficult to carry out and would not give assurance of compliance, with, as he put it, 100 per cent elimination (ENDC/PV.68, pp.29-30). Now I must admit that the Soviet delegation, which had during the previous week given us some very good advice with regard to the new dance called the Twist, demonstrated its expertise in twisting on 10 August. I admire Mr. Zorin's dancing ability but I have certain minor reservations concerning the application of logic in this instance.

The point is that the Soviet representative applied our suggested first-stage zonal verification arrangements for the first-stage measures of the United States plan to the first-stage measures in the Soviet plan. Of course, they do not fit.

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The zonal verification suggestions which I presented for stage I would, however, fit the first-stage measures of the United States plan or the first third of the total reduction of delivery vehicles in the Soviet plan. Similarly, the complete zonal inspection suggestions in the United States plan would fit the total reduction process in either plan, though, as I have pointed out, the impractical time period of two years in the Soviet plan for complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles would not allow sufficient time for adequate verification during the reduction process.

The essence of the United States suggestion -- a suggestion put forth in an effort to accommodate the previously expressed antagonistic views of the Soviet Union with regard to verification of initially declared levels -- is that, as arms are reduced, there should be sufficient verification to ensure a reasonable deterrence against violation of the agreement. We have sought, through an arrangement that would achieve less than total verification at the beginning, a degree of verification and, therefore, a degree of reassurance commensurate with the risks of each stage.

In this connexion I should like to say that there does seem to be some misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet Union of how zonal inspection would work. The Soviet representative said:

"With 70 per cent of the armaments remaining it would be almost impossible to prove this because we should then have to inspect the entire country from one end to the other" (ENDC/PV.68, p.27).

The Soviet representative said further:

"... if we wished to prove that any remainder was not part of the permitted 70 per cent but in excess of it ... one would have to count every type of armament" (ibid.).

That is not the way a zonal inspection arrangement would work. If verification of a particular zone selected for inspection showed that the amounts of various types of armaments and production facilities in that zone were the same as the amounts which had previously been declared for it, before the host government could have known that it would be selected for early inspection, that would constitute the required degree of assurance of compliance for that particular stage of disarmament. We would then say, on that set of facts, that the host government had been shown to be acting honourably and honestly. As the risks increased with the continuation of the

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disarmament process in later stages the degree of assurance would be increased through the verification of additional zones; but, in the absence of specific notice of violation, there would not be total verification before the end of stage III of the remaining arms and any non-declared production facilities in the zones which happened not to be selected for verification until near the completion of the disarmament process. I do hope that that clarifies for the Soviet delegation that aspect of our suggestions regarding zonal inspection.

Now let me turn to the third principal objection raised in the Soviet statement of 10 August (ibid., p.30) -- an objection which I suspect may be the real basis for such lack of enthusiasm for zonal inspection as was exhibited by our Soviet colleagues on Friday last. That objection was that verification of one zone would result in the acquisition of information about the military establishment of the inspected country, which would be dangerous from the standpoint of, as the Soviet representative put it:

"any country that may expect a nuclear blow on the part of another state"

(ibid., p.31)

First of all let me say that the question of which side fears a nuclear attack is a subjective question. The Soviet delegation should realize, and I am sure it does that there is concern on both sides in this connexion. Let me assure the Soviet delegation again that we want wholesome and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union; the people of the United States and the Soviet people are basically friendly. The United States has no intention whatsoever of making a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; I should like to assure my Soviet colleagues of that.

However, let us turn to the argument. In the past expressions of this concern by the Soviet Union have been focused primarily on the possibility of what is called the acquisition of target data, and it was partly to meet those concerns, whether or not they were justified, that the United States put forward the concept of zonal inspection as an example of a possible solution of a difficult problem. As I pointed out in my statement of 10 August (ibid., p.17), the geographical location of military installations within a zone would not be revealed until a zone had been selected for verification; there would be only a general declaration describing the military establishment in the zone, which could cover an area of many tens or even hundreds of thousands of square miles. Moreover, there would be no requirement to reveal geographical locations in any other zone until such subsequent periods when, as arms were further reduced, this or that zone was selected for verification.

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It would appear from what the Soviet delegation did not say about the acquisition of target data in its statement of 10 August that that previous objection on its part had in fact been met. Now we find additional objections, objections of a more general nature, concerning the military information that would be revealed.

In his comments of 10 August the Soviet representative said, "Let us approach this matter sensibly" (ibid., p.31). Very well then, approaching the matter as sensibly as I know how, I should like to say this to the Soviet delegation: We have sought to meet your major concern with our suggestion that we study zonal inspection, and I believe we have met your major concern -- the question of the acquisition of target data. Now you say you have further concerns. How, then, if verification is not to be a farce -- and I am sure neither one of us wants it to be a farce -- can we assure each other that as we reduce our arms we do it together, in a balanced manner? If, as I am sure we are, we are going to continue our dialogue in depth, we must recognize that one side cannot carry on a monologue with regard to its concerns. There are other concerns than those you see in the acquisition as a consequence of verification of some military information, which could not be of critical importance in facilitating an attack, as could target information. After all, I suppose some military information would be gained just from examining the armaments consigned for destruction to the bonfire of any stage. Thus, one major concern for us is that we proceed together along this road of disarmament to reduce our arms in equitable and balanced steps and stages. We have sought to meet your concerns and, we submit, you must seek to meet ours. To reach disarmament each of us must make some adjustments; we must not over-emphasize the protection of our own concerns only at the price of obstructing real disarmament.

In that connexion I might say that we have believed we could make those adjustments, particularly in the early stages, because we both already know a great deal, both generally and specifically, about each other's military establishment at the present time. And just as that fact has allowed the United States to make adjustments in its inspection proposals that would meet the major concern of the Soviet Union, so we honestly believe that that fact should be examined impartially by the Soviet Union. Indeed, we submit that it should induce the Soviet Union to make some adjustments to meet our concern that a reasonable degree of effective verification should actually accompany the reduction process.

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As I have noted, some of the so-called disclosure of military information which the Soviet Union seems to be concerned about as a possible result of zonal inspection would result of necessity from the implementation of the Soviet Union's own proposals for verification of arms destroyed if the Soviet Union wished to ensure that the arms destroyed were actually serviceable ones. Moreover, the United States does not envisage that the inspection conducted in the selected zone would be without any ground rules. Surely we could devise arrangements to protect nations from disclosure of certain military information which might be obtained as a result of the inspection of installations, access to which would not be required to ensure verification of agreed measures.

Disarmament is bound to bring with it changes in the established ways of doing things and old patterns of thought. Such a monumental advance in world history cannot be had without some sacrifices and risks, and the United States approach shows that we are ready both to take some risks and to make our due share of the sacrifices. Let us seek some common means of meeting the concerns which each have. Let us see if we can in this Committee, or in informal discussion, find ways to bridge the gap of which I spoke earlier. In our suggestions outlined at the sixty-eighth meeting we sought, from our side, to build this bridge. While I have not discussed today all the questions which were raised by the Soviet statement of 10 August, I have sought to discuss the major questions in order to assist our Soviet colleagues in their understanding of our concerns. In turn, we ask our Soviet colleagues to start on their side patiently and constructively to bridge this gap.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I have the names of three more representatives on my list of speakers. I wonder whether the Committee wishes to continue sitting until they have made their statements or whether we should adjourn and hear them -- together with some others, I am sure -- at the next meeting?

Mr. LALL (India): We have just heard a very detailed and very important statement. I think we should all like to consider it very carefully, and for that reason this might be an appropriate time to stop. By that I do not mean to suggest that the other representatives should not make their statements, but I think we would be more in a position to digest those statements if we were to adjourn now and to hear them at the next meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): Unless I hear any objection to the suggestion of the representative of India I shall take it that it is so agreed.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-third plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Alamayehu, the representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada and the United States.

"The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament will recess beginning 8 September and will resume at Geneva on Monday, 12 November, 1962. The co-Chairmen, after consultation with members of the Committee, are empowered by the Committee to set a different date for reconvening at Geneva if circumstances in their judgement so warrant, taking into account both the expected termination date of the consideration of disarmament at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and the desirability of reconvening the Committee at Geneva at as early a date as possible.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 24 August, 1962, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.